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Empirical research has shown that the economic success of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in many countries derives from the degree to which they are able to 
overcome market and institutional failures by being embedded in private institutional 
support systems.  In some cases, long-term business relationships substitute for weak 
public institutions.  In other cases, private institutional support mechanisms are provided 
by large firms to SMEs by way of various business linkages, for example through sub-
contracting networks.  In still others, cooperative relations among groups of SMEs, 
organized in business networks and in associations or local community clusters, perform 
these functions.  Prominent examples of such private orderings can be found in the inter-
firm relationships and informal credit arrangements in many Asian and Eastern European 
countries (Mcmillan and Woodruf 2003), as well as in the satellite networks in Japan, 
industry clusters in Taiwan, and industrial districts in Italy and the United States (Piore 
and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1990; Brusco 1992).  
The evidence that private institutional arrangements facilitate the performance of 
SMEs in many countries fits a theory of the firm that views the enterprise as a collection 
of contracts and relationships between its various stakeholders and with other firms 
involved in related activities (Coase 1937, 1988; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Williamson 
1985).
1  In this conception of the firm, it is the totality of these contracts and relationships 
(the firm’s “architecture”) that defines the firm and creates its distinctive capabilities.  
Distinctive capabilities, in turn, determine the firm’s competitive potential (Kay 1993).  
For each contract and relationship there is a corresponding financial flow – sales 
revenues, payments to suppliers, wage bill, payments to investors – or a corresponding 
flow of returns to social capital (or flow of network externalities).  The objective of the 
firm is to put together an architecture of contracts and relationships that maximizes value 
added.  Since all countries face problems of asymmetric information and state law is far 
from costless in time and money and may even lead to outcomes that are worse then 
outcomes obtained by private orderings, the value of architecture rests mainly in its 
                                                 
1 This view of the firm has roots in both transaction cost economics, whose chief proponent is Oliver 
Williamson, and in the concept of the firm as a collection of contracts, proposed first by Alchian and 
Demsetz.    3
capacity to assist in overcoming market and government failures and in its capacity to 
reduce transaction costs.  Firms that can establish efficient architectures can more 
effectively enforce property rights and business contracts, enhance learning, increase 
flexibly to respond to changing circumstances, and achieve easy and open exchanges of 
information, thereby enhancing the potential for division of labor among firms and 
collective action.    
Viewed in this theoretical light, the ability of SMEs to develop and sustain a 
unique set of private institutional arrangements, adapted to the characteristics of their 
business transactions and to the investment climate they face, is crucial to the nature of 
their competitive advantage.  It follows then that impediments to establishing and 
sustaining such unique architectures could have negative affects on SME entry and 
performance.  For policymakers and development agencies interested in promoting SME 
development in poor countries, these propositions have spurred interest in interventions 
to assist firms in building the architectures (social capital) found in populations of 
successful SMEs.  In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), for example, in the wake of policy 
reforms to stimulate private sector development, efforts have been introduced to build up 
private support mechanisms for SME development by way of “linkage programs,” 
bringing large firms and small subcontractors together, and by way of “cluster 
development” initiatives.  And, in the financial area, programs have aimed at expanding 
enterprise networks into SME lending and savings mobilization mechanisms. 
Do such programs make sense for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa?  Observing 
that a particular architecture of private institutional arrangements plays a role in SME 
success is not a clear cut argument for intervening to encourage its development.  Other 
alternatives may be superior – such as strengthening formal market institutions.  It may 
also be that efficient private institutional support mechanisms for SMEs will emerge 
naturally on their own via market forces.  Moreover, if intervention were called for, what 
types of policies would make sense?  Experienced Africa development specialists often 
point out that decentralized markets in the region are not reaching efficient outcomes 
because of the form that private institutional arrangements take, that market 
fragmentation is frequent, and that entry in certain industries is restricted because of the   4
activities of business networks.  Such incongruities can have substantial implications for 
what development programs do in this area.  A better understanding of the institutions 
that support market exchange in SSA would seem essential in developing effective policy 
prescriptions.   
To address these questions, we use data and research results from the Regional 
Program for Enterprise Development (RPED), a program of manufacturing enterprise 
surveys across the SSA region, conducted by the World Bank in the 1990s.
2  Among 
other things, RPED firm-level data can be used to examine the forms of private support 
institutions found in SSA and to assess how these private orderings shape patterns of 
market exchange and firm performance. The first section of the paper lays some 
groundwork with a brief review of the forces driving the formation of private support 
institutions in the region.  We then look at the social capital embodied in these business 
support institutions and the way this social capital influences firm performance.  In the 
last section, we consider the natural limits private support institutions face in the SSA 
setting in fostering SME structural transformation and the role for policy and programs.   
The paper finds that SMEs in SSA endeavor to get around market failure and the 
lack of formal institutions protecting property rights and contracts by creating private 
governance systems in the form of long-term business relationships and networks, as 
firms do in other parts of the world.  But in much of the region, SMEs find it hard even to 
establish these simple relation-based governance architectures.  Economic instability 
undermines and weakens incentives for long-term, cooperative business relationships and 
hinders the creation of efficient private institutional arrangements.  In this environment 
tight, ethnically-based, business networks thrive.  However, a coordination failure in the 
indigenous-African manufacturing business community keeps firms from developing 
network-based governance architectures analogous to those found in ethnic minority 
communities.  It is shown that there are important links between these informal 
governance institutions and SME performance.  Networks raise the performance of 
“insiders” and, in the sparse business environments of the SSA region, tight networks can 
                                                 
2 For a description of the RPED research program and data see the World Bank website 
www.worldbank.org/rped. 
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have attendant negative consequences for market participation of “outsiders,” such as 
indigenous-African SMEs.  This is indicated through the determinants of access to 
supplier credit.  In addition to longer-term, cumulative efforts to built up high-quality 
formal institutions, policy interventions will be needed to improve the platform for 
relation-based governance mechanisms and to address the exclusionary effects of tight 
networks.  
 
I. Markets and Private Support Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Economic Environment, Institutions, and Transaction Costs  
The RPED surveys provide us with a broad picture of the characteristics of 
manufacturing firms and the business climate in SSA (Biggs and Srivastava 1996; 
Bigsten et al 2000a; Fafchamps 2004).  Firms are mainly small with few assets and 
limited access to finance.  At the upper end of a largely bi-modal size distribution is a 
small group of large companies (200 employees or more), with more access to finance 
(and often significant debt), which do business mainly in sparse local markets.  The 
middle of the size distribution of firms is still relatively empty. Technical and 
management skills are low on average, and absenteeism and acts of employee pilfering 
are numerous.  Product standardization is relatively low.  Businesses operate under 
conditions of considerable uncertainty.  Financial and insurance markets are severely 
underdeveloped, limiting access to credit and insurance.  And market exchange is 
underpinned by weak public institutions of property rights and contract, poor governance, 
and poor infrastructure services.  These market features combine to increase the 
uncertainty of business relationships and raise transaction costs of exchange. 
Small companies with few assets reduce the efficacy of legal actions.  There are 
few assets to seize in the case of default and transactions are generally too small to justify 
the time and money involved in formal court actions.  Many business deals simply avoid 
problems by engaging in self-enforcing, cash-on-delivery spot transactions.  These kinds 
of business relationships facilitate exchange in many cases, but if exchange is confined to   6
such simple forms of governance, it can be costly in terms of foregone profitable 
opportunities requiring more complex contracting arrangements.  
Transactions that involve complex products and substantial quantities, which 
often require inter-temporal arrangements, such as ordering in advance, invoicing, and 
supplier credit, face significant difficulties in SSA.  First off, there is the problem of high 
variation in product quality.  Low standardization in production in much of 
manufacturing – producers are often “job-shop” manufacturers, making one-off products, 
rather than “assembly-line” producers of standard products –  and unevenness in skill 
levels across firms increase the likelihood of quality variation in production.  Moreover, 
the small number of upstream suppliers in the market for many products means that 
buyers cannot be confident that competition will have ensured the quality of various 
suppliers.  Such factors compel buyers to perform costly inspections of orders.  Second, 
searching out and trying different suppliers is difficult and costly in the SSA environment 
where information is limited, communication is difficult, and infrastructure is poor.  
Third, limited information about businesses and consumers, poor communications, and 
the fact that many small firms do not have fixed business sites, makes it relatively easy 
for delinquent clients to renege on their accounts.  Vetting clients for supplier credit is 
thus difficult and offering credit is risky. Consequently, supplier credit and invoicing are 
reserved for transactions with larger, well-known clients. 
Legal and judicial systems in the region are plagued by antiquated laws and 
procedures, insufficient human and material resources, poor management, and 
corruption.
3  These problems have resulted in extensive case backlogs and long delays, 
high costs, and a public perception of the legal and judicial system as too costly, 
unworkable, and corrupt for resolution of most commercial disputes.  Of course, the 
sophistication and quality of legal institutions varies somewhat across countries and there 
are cases in the RPED surveys where businesses have taken legal disputes to court.  
                                                 
3 The Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, 2005 ranks the quality of SSA’s 
business environment at the bottom of the heap.  Its index of “Quality of National Business Environment,” 
which measures regulatory obstacles and legal obstacles to doing business, ranks the USA 2, India 32, and 
four countries in SSA we will be examining in this paper Kenya 63, Zambia 73, Zimbabwe 84, and 
Tanzania 87.   7
Firms also report using the threat of court action in a few countries to persuade clients to 
pay.  These cases, however, are mostly concentrated in the largest firm size categories of 
the sample and in a few countries.  For all intents and purposes formal contract 
enforcement mechanisms are not used by the great majority of firms, particularly SMEs. 
Finally, the economies of SSA countries are prone to shocks – periodic weather-
related distress in agriculture, civil strife, terms-of-trade shocks, frequent policy changes 
and poor policy management, corruption, infrastructure breakdowns and so on.
4 These 
jolts to the economic system cause unanticipated changes in prices and transaction costs, 
shortages in critical inputs, production setbacks, delays in payment by customers and 
transportation problems, which result in unexpected changes in enterprise cash flows.  
Given the acute financial positions of most firms in these poor economies, and the 
underdevelopment of financial and insurance markets, these unanticipated fluctuations in 
income often render firms unable to pay on time or to deliver promised products to 
customers.  This financial stress transmits further shocks through the market as other 
producers and suppliers must adjust.  In such shock-prone, financially constrained 
circumstances, firms find it difficult to plan and to predict the behavior of trading 
partners.  
The Formation of Informal, Private Support Institutions 
Firms respond to the market imperfections and inadequate public enforcement of 
property rights and contracts in SSA by creating architectures of relational contracts that 
substitute for failed or non-existent formal institutions and economize on search and 
screening costs.  They enter into long-term trading relationships, relying on incentives to 
cooperate that arise from playing a repeated game, and they share information and 
provide mutual insurance in networks, fashioning collectivist systems of enforcement 
based on multilateral reputation mechanisms.   
As the formal legal system is unreliable for settling commercial disputes and costs 
of search and verification are high, firms trust their long-term customers and suppliers to 
                                                 
4 A detailed discussion of this issue is provided in Collier and Gunning (1999).   8
pay their bills and deliver quality products on the prospect of future business.  Trust is 
built on a history of successful, repeat transactions.  The RPED surveys show, for 
example, that firms generally deal with a single supplier of a particular input on a regular 
basis (even when they have a choice among sources of supply) and the average length of 
relationship exceeds seven years (Bigsten et al. 2000a).  But, as many economic activities 
require dealing with different partners at different times and cooperation is more easily 
sustained in relationships if sanctions for opportunistic behavior come not just from the 
business partner who has been cheated but also from other firms in the business 
community, business and community networks are formed to govern transactions.
5 Self-
governance in such networks works by sharing information on non-delivery, late 
payment, and default via a multilateral reputation mechanism, supported by a framework 
of credible commitment, enforcement, and coordination.   
At early stages of industrialization incentives based on repeated interactions work 
well.  The fact that it is difficult to locate alternative business partners in the SSA 
environment, because there are few firms, because market information is inadequate, and 
because transportation costs are high, persuades firms to make efforts to maintain their 
existing relationships.  They recognize that they are locked in to some extent with 
existing business partners because of high search and screening costs.  This provides 
incentives to behave cooperatively – i.e. reduces incentives for opportunism (Kranton 
1996; Ramey and Watson 2001).  As a consequence, such self-enforcing relational 
contracts are shown in the RPED surveys to be one of the standard ways for 
manufacturers, suppliers and clients to do business in the region.  A large majority of 
African manufactures describe their relationships with suppliers and clients as simple 
long-term business acquaintances (Bigsten et al. 2000a).   
But the SSA business environment also has features that work to undermine and 
weaken repeated-game incentives for cooperative behavior.  Self-enforcing transactions, 
governed through repeated interaction, depend on expectations about the future (Axelrod 
1984; McMillan and Woodruff 2003).  There are generally short-term gains to be made 
                                                 
5 One could, of course, consider the transactions of a repeated game and the relational contracting thereof a 
network.  Here we define a network to include a broader set of economic functions where members of a 
business group or “club” share information and informally enforce contracts.   9
from breaking relational contracts.  This follows from the very nature of relation-based 
governance.  Contractor’s freedom of action is not restricted by any legal requirement, 
but by concern for subsequent loss of business, reputation, or trust.  For future benefits to 
be large enough to induce cooperative behavior, the discounted value of expected future 
profits must be larger than the gains that could be made from reneging on the deal.  Two 
conditions in the SSA business environment negatively influence the value and 
predictability of future gains from such relationships and make it harder to establish and 
sustain cooperation.
6   
First, all business relationships involve risks.  Generally such risks are known and 
can be planned for or ways can be found to hedge them.  But the shock-prone SSA 
environment adds an extra element of uncertainty to the equation.  Uncertainty makes it 
more difficult to predict a business partner’s gains and undermines the effectiveness of 
repeated interaction incentives.  When conditions are stable, contracts and business 
relationships have a predictable value.  Firms offering credit, for example, know the loan 
value – it is predictable to the supplier and to the customer – and the amount of credit 
offered can be set to benefit the supplier when it is repaid.  The value of continuing the 
relationship is thus predictable.  Unforeseen shocks change all of this.  The value of not 
making the required payment fluctuates because of the shocks.  If the gains from 
breaking the promise to pay are large enough, then the customer will default.  Relational 
contracts are thus much harder to sustain in shock-prone environments, because it is 
harder to predict the behavior of the business partner and to value the relationship.  In 
addition, the costs of establishing relational contracts (i.e. costs of building trust) are 
much higher in shock-prone environments.  Shocks induce unforeseen turnover and 
                                                 
6 One of the consequences of the difficult environment for sustaining cooperation in the SSA region is a 
very low level of subcontracting.  A comparison of data from firm-level surveys conducted under the 
World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment program in China versus countries in the SSA region shows 
that, in China, 22% of manufacturing output is produced for other firms. In contrast, only 3% of 
manufacturing output is subcontracted in Africa.  When we look at the percentage of firms that work as 
subcontractors, with 10% or more of their output being subcontracting work, 35% of firms in China are 
subcontractors, compared with only about 6% in the SSA region.  China certainly cannot be held up as the 
best contracting environment in the world, but its relative economic and political stability does provide a 
superior platform for relation-based governance of cooperative business transactions. 
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changes in enterprise control often destroying relationships in their wake.  This forces 
firms to bear the costs of rebuilding trust relationships and architectures more frequently.   
Second, in conditions where financial markets are underdeveloped and access to 
credit is limited the opportunity cost of capital is high and firms have an incentive to take 
profits today rather than wait for profits tomorrow.  Firms have a high discount rate on 
the future.  Poverty and culture (e.g. family and community-based risk-pooling) reinforce 
such inducements to take current profits and tend to undermine the value of future gains 
from business relationships, making it harder to establish and sustain cooperation.   
Weakened incentives for cooperation, together with extraordinarily high costs of 
searching, screening, and deterring opportunism in SSA, increase the importance of 
business networks for market exchange.  In these circumstances, there is an added need 
for the information and collectivist system of enforcement that a network can provide to 
help make and sustain relational contracts.  This is especially true for labor, credit, and 
other factor market transactions, which are even more susceptible to opportunistic 
behavior than product market transactions.  Given the importance of relation-based 
governance of business transactions in the region, features that make it harder to establish 
and sustain cooperative relationships in factor markets create barriers to efficiency and 
growth.  In helping to improve the possibilities for relational contracting, business 
networks play a supporting role in market development and enhance firm performance. 
The RPED surveys allow us to examine the importance of networks in SSA in 
some detail.  In the next section, we look at the effects of networks on SME performance 
and consider the consequences of the forms that networks take for entry, efficiency, and 
growth.       11
II. The Power of the Network and Firm Performance 
In the presence of economic instability, market imperfections, and weak 
government-provided legal institutions, the power of the African business network rests 
partly on the exchange of information through it and on group enforcement, and partly on 
the ready ability of the group to support transactions that benefit from relation-based 
governance, such as financing, sales, and distribution to customers outside the immediate 
neighborhood.  Evidence of such network externalities (or social capital) in SSA has been 
provided by Barr (2000), Fafchamps (2000, 2004), Biggs, Raturi and Srivastava (2003), 
and Fisman (2001,2002). 
Community connections play a crucial role in the membership of African business 
networks.  The RPED surveys show that ethnicity is a strong indicator of network activity 
in manufacturing.  Ethnic minority groups, for example, dominate many of the major 
manufacturing activities.  In East Africa, for example, business networks of Indian 
ethnicity concentrate in segments of light manufacturing and import/export trade.  In 
Southern Africa, European business networks control much of the upstream activities in 
manufacturing and mining.  And in West Africa, Lebanese business networks are heavily 
involved in import/export trade and parts of the wood industry.  Across the region 
indigenous-African, ethnically-based networks are found mainly in agricultural and 
natural resource activities – the Luo, in Kenya, are networked in the fishing industry and 
the Ashanti, in Ghana, in the cocoa industry.  African ethnically-based networks can also 
be found in small-scale industrial activities, such as metal working, furniture, food 
processing and clothing.  Fafchamps (2004) argues that the distinct patterns of ethnic 
concentration in business, observed across SSA, can be explained to a great degree by a 
restricted entry process in business networks and by network externalities.  Since network 
externalities bestow comparative advantages in business on network members, important 
ethnic communities earn rents and become dominant in particular segments of the 
economy.  Networks reinforce themselves through a referral process and statistical 
discrimination.     12
To examine the activities of these ethnically-based business networks and see 
how network externalities confer advantages on members of the group, we focus on a 
subset of the RPED sample that includes entrepreneur-owned firms, as these firms 
constitute the SMEs in our sample.  Four countries provide the backdrop for the 
investigation – Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  It was in these countries that 
the surveys gathered data on ethnic business networks. 
Estimates of the Effect of Network Externalities on SME Performance 
How might networks affect enterprise performance?  In circumstances where 
there is a high degree of economic uncertainty, market imperfections are endemic, and 
formal legal institutions are weak, networks could aid entrepreneurs in entering the 
market.  Members of a network, for example, might be expected to start larger firms, 
because the network provides connections and credible multilateral enforcement 
capabilities that facilitate access to supplier credit and other inputs, aid the flow of 
information on technologies and markets, or ease access to equity investments.   
Similarly, a network’s impact on enterprise productivity or growth could be significant 
where there are information barriers and credit constraints and firms have difficulty 
enforcing property rights and business contracts.  Networks could provide positive 
externalities that help firms to overcome such problems, improving value added and 
growth prospects.  Where problems of asymmetric information and enforcement are less 
important one would expect the value of network externalities to be smaller.  But, as we 
know from the literature, relation-based governance via stable and cohesive networks can 
be found even in advanced countries with well-developed information and legal 
infrastructures (see for example Bernstein 1992).  These issues are examined here.  
Tables 1 through 3 present descriptive statistics that are used in the analysis.  
Table 1 describes the ethnic distribution of firms in the RPED sample.  It shows that the 
majority of SMEs in manufacturing in Tanzania and Zambia are indigenous-African 
owned, while in Kenya and Zimbabwe minority ethnic groups are more important: 
Indian-Asians dominate in Kenya, and represent a significant share of ownership in the 
other three countries, and Europeans are the most important entrepreneurial group   13
(although not by much) in Zimbabwe.
7  In all the countries, networks of ethnic minority 
firms produce a large share of value added in manufacturing and control a large share of 
the upstream supplier industries.    
Table 1: Ethnic Distribution of SMEs (percent of firms) 
  Kenya Tanzania  Zambia  Zimbabwe 
African  39 73 61 40 
Asian  60 25 26 16 
European  0.5 0.0 11  41 
Other   0.5 2  2  3 
No. of firms  184 158 159 132 
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 1990s. Regional Program on Enterprise Development, World Bank 
Tables 2 and 3 present the financial characteristics of SMEs in our sample.  We 
see that a large percentage of SMEs receive supplier credit in Zimbabwe compared with 
the other countries.  This is explained by the deeper financial system and more highly 
developed manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe in the 1990s.  SMEs in Kenya have 
relatively more access to bank finance than in the other countries – 25 percent of SMEs 
received at least some bank credit to start their firms, compared with 8 to 11 percent 
elsewhere.  However, as table 3 shows, these characteristics differ significantly across 
ethnic groups. In all countries, minorities have much greater access to finance and longer 
relationship with their suppliers compared to indigenous African entrepreneurs; Tanzania 
is the only country where these differences are not significant, except for title to property. 
Table 2: Finance Characteristics of SMEs 
 Kenya  Tanzania  Zambia  Zimbabwe 
Pct. receiving 
Supplier Credit  
30.3 11.8 19.2 66.4 
Avg. years of  
supplier relation 
8.5 7.9 8.6  12.0 
Pct with  title to 
property 
37.4 37.1 47.9 43.2 
Pct. rec. any bank 
loan at startup  
24.6 8.2 11.4  11.2 
Source: Enterprise Surveys 1990s, Regional Program on Enterprise Development, World Bank 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the RPED sample was drawn on the basis of employment rather than on the basis 
of the number of firms.   14
Table 3: Finance Characteristics of SMEs, by Ethnicity 
 Kenya  Tanzania  Zambia  Zimbabwe 
  African Minority African Minority African Minority African Minority 
Pct. receiving 
Supplier Credit  
13.8 43.5***  9.9  16.3  10.8 32.3*** 29.1 92.4*** 
Avg. years of  
supplier relation 
6.5 10.0*** 6.9  10.5*  6.7 11.3*** 8.6 16.0*** 
Pct with  title to 
property 
13.8 56.5*** 23.9 69.4*** 33.3 70.8*** 34.5 49.4*** 
Pct. rec. any 
bank loan at 
startup  
12.6 34.2***  6.6  12.2  10.7  12.3  3.6  16.5** 
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 1990s. Regional Program on Enterprise Development, World Bank 
*** Differences are significant at 99% confidence level; ** Significant at 95% confidence level; 
*Significant at 90%;  
Table 4 shows the educational attainment of entrepreneurs managing SMEs in 
these four African countries.  Differences are evident between ethnic minority 
entrepreneurs and indigenous-African entrepreneurs, particularly in the level of higher 
education attained.  Many more ethnic-minority entrepreneurs have university degrees 
and secondary school educations. 
Table 4: Highest Educational Attainment of Entrepreneurs (percent) 
  Primary Secondary  Technical  Ed. Univ 
African  36 28 24 12 
Asian  12 38 15 35 
European  2  32 33 33 
      
Kenya  28 36 14 22 
Zambia  13 31 33 23 
Zimbabwe  16 26 32 26 
Tanzania  39 32 12 17 
Source: Enterprise Surveys 1990s, Regional Program on Enterprise Development, World Bank   15
Networks and SME Entry 
Table 5 presents the results of a regression analysis that examines the power of 
the ethnic network in determining firm size at start up.  Size at entry is important because 
it is a predictor of future prospects, such as survival and ability to grow in the SSA 
environment (Biggs and Shah 2002).  The hypothesis is that members of a network are 
able to start larger firms, because the network provides connections, information, and 
governance capabilities, which facilitate access to credit and other inputs, access to 
technologies and markets, or access to equity investments.   
We examine first the effect on size at start-up of belonging to a minority ethnic 
network without controlling for other possible determinants of size at start.  Model I 
looks at whether networked entrepreneurs start firms in a different size class compared 
with indigenous-African firms.  We know from the RPED surveys that indigenous-
African SMEs in manufacturing in these countries lack the strong business networks 
enjoyed by ethnic minority entrepreneurs (Biggs and Srivastava 1996; Fafchamps 2004).  
In particular, they lack effective multilateral reputation mechanisms able to share 
information on payment histories and enforce contracts through group sanctions.  The 
results of model I confirm that the coefficients for Asian and European networked firms 
are highly significant and positive, indicating that firms belonging to these stable and 
cohesive business groups start at twice the size of indigenous-African firms.  
 
But this result could be influenced by other factors, such as education of the 
entrepreneurs, their initial assets or their access to start-up finance.  Model II controls for 
human capital.  The results demonstrate that educational attainment matters.  
Entrepreneurs with university or technical degrees start bigger firms.  The coefficient for 
university education, for example, suggests that entrepreneurs with a university degree 
start firms approximately 50 percent larger than entrepreneurs with only primary 
education.  Nevertheless the network coefficient remains positive and highly significant   16
indicating that the power of the network is still evident even after controlling for the 
effects of human capital.   
If finance constrains size at start up, then entrepreneurs with larger assets and 
access to finance could be expected to start larger firms.  When we control for the 
entrepreneur’s financial position at start-up in model III, the results show that firms with 
more collateralizable assets, such as title to property, start bigger firms, as do firms with 
access to bank loans.  Informal loans, on the other hand, appear to be insignificant in 
determining startup size.  But controlling for assets and access to finance does not 
diminish the effect of network externalities.  The network coefficients are reduced 
somewhat, but they still remain large and significant.  So, while attributes of 
entrepreneurs, such as education and training and access to finance, play an important 
role, it is clear that being a member of a stable and cohesive business network is a key 
determinant of size at entry in SSA.  
   17
Table 5: Determinants of Startup Size: regression results
8 
  Model 1  Model II  Model III 
























Informal Loan    - 0 . 1 1  
(0.18) 
Bank Loan    0.56*** 
(0.14) 
Title    0.54*** 
(0.11) 
















































Adj. Rsq  0.22 0.25 0.31 
N  472 472 472 
*** Significant at 99% confidence level; ** Significant at 95% confidence level; *Significant at 90%;  
                                                 
8    In the regressions, size at start is defined by log of the number of employees at start up. The 
explanatory variables are defined as follows:  
Lagest:  is log of the entrepreneur’s age when he/she started the firm  
Secdary: dummy, =1 if entrepreneur has secondary school education 
Univ: dummy, =1 if entrepreneur has university degree  
Teched: dummy, =1 if entrepreneur has vocational/technical degree  
Inf. Loan: dummy, =1 if entrepreneur obtained loans from friends and family, or supplier credit, for 
startup  
Bank Loan: =1 if firm obtained formal loan for startup  
Title: =1 if entrepreneur has ownership rights on business property 
Asian Network: dummy variable, =1 if entrepreneur is Asian 
European Network: dummy variable, =1 if entrepreneur is European  
The models also include dummy variables controlling for sector and country differences.  
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Networks and SME Productivity 
The set of relational contracts that make up the architecture of the firm shapes the 
firm’s distinctive capabilities and its competitive potential, as we noted earlier.  For each 
relational contract there is a corresponding financial flow or flow of network 
externalities.  Firms try to put together an architecture of relationships that maximizes 
value added.  In table 6, we examine the contribution of network externalities to 
enterprise productivity.  In the context of pervasive market and government failures, 
networks are hypothesized to raise productivity because network externalities improve 
access to finance and other inputs, facilitate the flow of information on technology and 
markets, and enhance coordination of business activities and governance of business 
contracts.  
The analysis uses an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, where human 
capital, financial capital, and networking variables are included as added explanatory 
variables.  The left hand side measures log of value added. The explanatory variables 
include: capital, log of replacement cost of capital; a measure of capacity utilization; 
labor, log of total workers; education; sector and country dummies; a dummy variable for 
access to supplier credit; and mean years of relationship with the supplier of the main 
input.  
We control for the education of managers in the production function as it is 
conjectured that more educated managers deal with the day to day complexities of 
running a firm more efficiently, and perhaps find, decode, and deploy technologies more 
effectively than less educated managers.  Including finance in the equation is more 
controversial, as it is difficult to determine the direction of causation.  Our hypothesis is 
that finance – specifically working capital finance in the form of supplier credit – 
influences the firm’s day-to-day production capabilities in credit-constrained conditions, 
such as those found in SSA.  There is empirical evidence to warrant such a hypothesis.  
Fisman (2001) has shown that African firms lacking credit are more likely to face 
inventory shortages, leading to lower rates of capacity utilization and lower productivity.  
We also include length of relationship with supplier to control for the fact that firms with   19
long-term relationships with suppliers get better access to supplier credit and access to 
critical raw materials in times of shortages.  In addition, access to supplier credit is 
facilitated by the multilateral reputation mechanism of the business network.  To the 
degree that access to supplier credit is an important network externality one would expect 
the coefficient of the ethnic network variables to become insignificant when supplier 
credit is included.  
The results show that networked SMEs have significantly higher productivity.  
For example firms in the Asian network have productivity that is roughly 37 percent 
higher than indigenous-African firms.  Education of managers is found to play only a 
modest role in determining productivity.  Firms that have managers with secondary   20
 
Table 6: Determinants of Productivity: regression results 
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*** Significant at 99% confidence level; ** Significant at 95% confidence level; *Significant at 90%;  
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education or have higher productivity than firms with managers that have only primary 
educations, or no formal education at all. But the returns to education do not increase 
significantly with additional qualifications, such as university education or a technical 
college degree.  The inclusion of human capital in the equation does not affect the size or 
significance of the network coefficients.  Access to supplier credit and length of supplier 
relationship, on the other hand, are both positive and significant determinants of 
productivity.  After inclusion of financial control variables the network coefficients 
continue to be positive and significant, however, the magnitude and significance of these 
network coefficients both decline.  The fact that network members continue to have 
higher productivity after controlling for access to supplier credit suggests that there are 
other advantages in belonging to the network besides gaining improved access to working 
capital.  
Networks and SME Growth 
Lastly, we look at the impact of networks on firm growth.  Network externalities 
are hypothesized to influence firm growth by alleviating financial constraints, providing 
technical and market information, and governing contracts and relationships that allow 
member firms to take advantage of a wider range of economic opportunities.  
Firm growth is defined as the logarithmic growth in employment between start-up 
and present. We look first at the impact of ethnic networks on growth, including only 
explanatory variables on firm size and age.  As in the other stepwise regressions above, 
country and sector dummies are also included.  We then augment the growth 
specification with human capital and financial characteristics to control for these 
variables. 
Firm size and age are expected to be negatively related to growth, confirming 
Gibrat’s Law and Jovanovic’s learning model (Jovanovic 1982).  According to Gibrat’s 
Law and Jovanovic’s model, efficient firms prosper and inefficient firms fail. 
Entrepreneurs learn about their efficiency over time.  This implies that smaller, younger 
firms should have higher and more variable growth rates than larger, older firms.  It also   22
implies that firm growth and variance are independent of size for firms of the same age.  
Many researches have tested Gibrat’s Law and Jovanovic’s learning model and found 
that growth and size are indeed negatively related (Hall 1987).  Education of managers is 
expected to have a positive impact on growth, as more educated and experienced 
managers are hypothesized to be better managers and innovators and, as a consequence, 
more growth-oriented.  Firms with stronger financial positions, represented by more 
numerous sources of startup finance, bank loans or informal loans, and collateralizable 
assets, such as title to its business property (proxy for the firm’s access to finance), are 
also expected to grow faster. 
The results of our model in table 7 show that firm age and size, as expected, are 
negatively related to growth.  And, after controlling for these variables, networked firms 
are shown to grow faster than other firms.  SMEs in the Asian network grow roughly 9 
percent faster than indigenous-African firms.  Education is found to be significant in 
determining firm growth.  Managers with secondary and university educations run SMEs 
that grow 6 percent faster on average than SMEs with managers attaining primary or no 
education.  But differences in rates of growth between networked firms and others cannot 
be explained by better education of the entrepreneurs managing networked firms.  The 
significance and magnitude of the network effect does not change when controls for 
education are included.  Finally, the regressions find that access to finance also matters 
for growth: firms that have collateralizable assets and access to formal finance grow 
faster than others.  Controlling for finance, however, does not affect the level of 
significance or the magnitude of the network coefficients.  Hence, network externalities 
are shown to make an important contribution to firm growth even after controlling for 
other factors, such as size and age of the firm and the entrepreneur’s human capital and 
access to finance. 
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Table 7: Determinants of Firm Growth: regression results 
  Model 1  Model II  Model III 
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Negative Network Effects 
Stable and cohesive business networks help member firms enter at larger size and 
perform better in SSA, but they can have some undesirable side effects on equity, market 
efficiency, and competition, and they may work to deny footing to later development of 
more appropriate institutions. (North 1990; Bardhan 2005; Fafchamps 2004).  The central 
problem is that, while network “insiders” gain advantages from network externalities, 
non-member “outsiders” can be excluded from essential business transactions – as in the 
case of access to supplier credit discussed at the end of this section.  
There are accumulated costs in building trust among network members and 
because of these sunk costs, members find it easier to deal with each other than to incur 
the added costs of screening new business partners.  “Outsiders” are therefore excluded 
from many business transactions.  “Outsiders” are also problematic where “insiders” have 
a minority status.  Members of important minority ethic networks in SSA, like the Indian-
Asians in East Africa or the Lebanese in West Africa, find it exceedingly difficult to 
enforce contracts against indigenous-African businesses in a setting where there is great 
potential for ethnic conflict and minorities have limited political leverage. Taken 
together, the features of African networks – network externalities, restricted entry, 
minority status, and sunk transaction costs – produce a kind of “lock-in:” rather stable 
business networks and rather static patterns of business exchange.  Lock-in is reinforced 
by economic conditions in many SSA countries.  In slow growing, poor economies, 
where business activity is mainly based on primary products and simple manufacturing, 
there is little innovative activity to shake things up and opportunities for gains from trade 
are relatively stable over time.  Plateau (2000) also finds that low density of population 
and businesses reinforces adverse effects of networks (monopoly, exclusiveness) and 
high density is conduce to the emergence of better networks and institutions.  Lastly, 
economic malaise, brought on by failed economic policies in many African countries, has 
meant fewer avenues open for economic advancement, and this has encouraged attempts 
to seek wealth by trading on ethnic connections (Bardhan 2005).   25
In this atmosphere, new firm formation and investment are challenging for 
entrepreneurs that are not members of existing networks.  Connections matter for access 
to financial resources, quality inputs, skilled labor, and information on technology and 
markets.  Network “insiders” have better access to these productive resources and 
therefore have larger size at entry, higher productivity and faster growth rates, as we have 
shown.  Relationships also matter for entering certain business activities.  New entrants 
have to deal with established market participants and create new business relationships.  
Some way has to be found to establish trust-based relationships and to enforce contracts. 
New investors with contacts in these business activities, because of referrals from other 
network “insiders” or relatives, have a distinct advantage.  As a consequence, 
entrepreneurs in SSA are inclined to enter businesses where they are known and 
connected.
9  
Ultimately, patterns of network specialization are established in specific activities, 
and information sharing, referrals, and existing relationships cause these patterns to 
persist over time.  Distinct patterns of ethnic concentration in particular businesses are 
quite evident in the RPED enterprise data (Biggs and Srivastava 1996; Bigsten et al 
2000).  This zoning of economic activity by business networks has distributional 
consequences.  Networks controlling highly profitable activities do better, and the 
resulting differentials in income that arise between groups can persist.  Non-members of 
the network are in effect excluded from many opportunities.  Exclusion and the 
persistence of income differences can lead to conflict, reduced investment, and capital 
flight.   
Partition of economic activity by networks also influences the allocative 
efficiency of financial and human capital.  Where business activities are controlled by 
                                                 
9 This has some similarities with what studies find in more developed countries. Entrepreneurs tend to start 
up businesses in industries where they have “experience” (Audretsch 1995).  Experience implies 
connections, as they are similarly useful in advanced countries for learning and getting access to resources 
and markets.  But in developed countries, where there are strong market institutions and more generalized 
trust, experience relates more to industry-specific technical knowledge and customer connections.  
Technical experience and customer knowledge are important in Africa too, as indicated in our regressions 
on determinants of size at start up and firm performance. But the argument here is that, in the presence of 
weak or missing market institutions and high transaction costs, connections are essential.  Without them 
entry and survival are highly problematical, as firms will have difficulties getting access to credit and 
inputs, as well as enforcing contracts.    26
different networks, investment capital is constrained in seeking the highest returns.  
Network members are compelled by virtue of their contacts to invest in particular 
businesses and “outsiders” are reluctant to invest in these areas.  Human capital formation 
can be effected too because the zoning of economic activity raises expected returns from 
human capital investments in economic activities where one has connections and lowers 
them in activities where one lacks connections.  Absent public institutions to ensure more 
generalized trust, young talent will tend to make career choices based on where they can 
expect to earn the highest returns, which is a function of connections.  In the same way, 
this prevailing connections-based reward structure can distort the allocation of scarce 
entrepreneurial resources, reducing innovation and new firm formation in potentially 
important areas of comparative advantage.  Hence, the aggregate efficiency cost of the 
partition of economic activity by networks can be high.   
Finally, the anti-competitive effects of the zoning of economic activity by 
networks can be substantial.  Control of certain business activities by particular networks 
restricts entry and drives up profits for the incumbent network.  Competitors face entry 
barriers because of high costs of building relation-based governance systems necessary to 
do business in these activities and the lack of connections that could reduce such costs.  
As a result, excess profits and the rents to network externalities persist.  This can be true 
of whole industries, as well as profitable segments along the value chain of particular 
industry segments.  Consequently, when all the adverse effects of tight networks in the 
SSA environment are considered, the costs can be high.   
An Example of Negative Network Effects 
Differential access to supplier credit provides a good example of negative 
network effects.  The extent to which network members actually rely on the network to 
obtain information about the trustworthiness of potential borrowers and to enforce 
contracts is difficult to measure directly.  It is also difficult to assess the degree to which 
non-members of the network are excluded from exchange.  Supplier credit outcomes can 
be used as a measure of both of these effects in the face of market and government 
failures.   27
The willingness of suppliers to extend credit to their customers, according to 
RPED survey respondents, depends on the risk of nonpayment (Biggs and Srivastava 
1996).  Given the inadequacy of courts, risk of nonpayment depends on the amount of 
information suppliers have about customers and the ability to enforce the contract 
informally.  Thus, a customer looking for credit has to establish a trust-based relationship 
with the supplier either by way of long-term repeat interactions or by way of connections.  
Public information about credit histories of firms, which could alleviate some of the 
concerns about information and enforcement problems, is unavailable in most African 
countries, and financial institutions and other firms are generally unwilling to share this 
type of information because it is a source of rents.  So firms must establish a relationship 
with each potential source of supplier credit, as we discussed earlier.   
Networks overcome many of these problems by sharing information about credit 
histories within the group and enforcing contracts within the group.  But the 
consequences of these network externalities are that non-members are left to the long 
process of getting credit via repeated interaction or not getting supplier credit at all. 
As upstream industries in many SSA countries are controlled by minority ethnic 
networks, it is the downstream small and medium indigenous-African producers that are 
excluded by network effects in most cases.  They have few connections to these minority 
communities and no equivalent multilateral reputation mechanism that facilitates the 
sharing of credit histories and enforcement.  Minority ethnic suppliers also find it hard to 
differentiate between indigenous-African firms, as their payment records do not travel 
across ethnic boundaries.  Indigenous-African SMEs are therefore subjected to statistical 
discrimination: they are all placed in the same high risk category by upstream suppliers.  
In addition, as we noted above, minority suppliers are apprehensive about enforcing 
contracts in the indigenous-African community because of political concerns.  They also 
know that when the time comes to make the inevitable decisions about contract 
flexibility, it will be difficult for them to get enough information on indigenous-African 
firms to sort out late payers with legitimate business problems from late payers just being 
opportunistic.    28
Table 8 presents the results of an analysis of the probability of receiving supplier 
credit in our four countries. We begin by estimating a probit regression to look at the 
effects of networks on access to credit.  We then examine the determinants of access to 
supplier credit for networked SMEs and indigenous-African SMEs separately.   
The role of the network in facilitating access to credit is considered in model I, 
where firm size (log empt) is included to control for the fact that larger firms have better 
access to credit.  The results show that networked SMEs are much more likely to receive 
supplier credit than indigenous-African SMEs.  As expected, the coefficient on firm-size 
is positive and significant, indicating that larger firms are more likely to get supplier 
credit than smaller firms.  These findings confirm those of other researchers using the 
RPED data who have noted an ethnic bias in supplier credit access in SSA. (Biggs, Raturi 
and Srivastava 2002; Fisman 2002; Fafchamps 2004).
10 
Adding the length of relationship with the supplier (log yrssrel) to the probit in 
model II, we see that the number of years a firm has known its supplier is significant in 
determining access to supplier credit.  This validates the notion that information gained 
from repeated interactions plays an important role in the willingness of suppliers to 
extend credit.  However, the fact that the network coefficients change only marginally in 
this regression indicates that the information provided by repeated interactions and firm-
size is not enough to explain credit access.  SMEs in networks are still much more likely 
to receive supplier credit than indigenous-African SMEs because of network 
externalities.
11  
                                                 
10 Fafchamps (2004) also analyzed financial case study data from about 40 firms and suppliers, collected by 
RPED teams in Zimbabwe and Kenya as part of the survey work in those countries.  He tries to explain 
why ethnic networks matter so much in getting access to supplier credit by using a "socialization" variable 
in his regressions, which measures the degree of networking among “insiders.”  Although the sample is 
quite small and the data are noisy, he tentatively finds that the network effect (socialization) is important, 
but ethnicity on its own still remains an important part of the ethnic impact on access to credit after 
controlling for networking.  He argues that the remainder of the effect might simply be statistical 
discrimination or other factors.  
 
11 Fisman (2002) finds in some of the RPED countries that firms are about twice as likely to obtain credit 
from suppliers from within their own ethnic community than from outsiders. 
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The advantages of the network are made even clearer by examining the 
determinants of access to supplier credit in the two groups of firms separately.  The 
analysis in models III and IV shows that, for SMEs in networks, the only determinant of 
access to supplier credit is firm size, and the magnitude of its importance is much smaller 
than for indigenous-African firms.  This suggests two things. First, networked SMEs do 
not have to rely on establishing long-term relationships with suppliers to get credit, as 
their reputation in the network provides enough information to lenders.  Second, even 
new firms in the network get access to supplier credit.  
Table 8: Probability of Receiving Supplier Credit 
Probit regression results 
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For indigenous-African SMEs, firm size and length of relationship with supplier are both 
shown to be important determinants of access to supplier credit.  As we noted above, 
many of the upstream supplier industries in SSA are controlled by ethnic minority firms 
and they extend the lion’s share of supplier credit.  In the absence of good information on 
indigenous-African firms, these suppliers use firm-size as a proxy for information and 
enforcement capability and for the value of the relationship. Thus, only large indigenous-
African firms get supplier credit without difficulty.  For members of the ethnic network, 
suppliers have relatively good information on their businesses and their social 
connections and firm-size is less useful (although the regressions show it still matters to 
some degree).  The end result is indigenous-African SMEs are treated as “outsiders” and 
are left to establishing long-term relationships with each supplier to get access to supplier 
credit.   
We calculated the predicted probabilities of receiving supplier credit for 
networked SMEs and indigenous-African SMEs, using model IV in table 8.  For the 
average-sized indigenous-African firm (9 employees), which had a four year relationship 
with its supplier, the likelihood of receiving credit was only 7 percent in Zambia (table 
9).  In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the chances of this non-networked firm receiving credit 
were higher, 18 percent and 32 percent respectively, reflecting differences across these 
countries, among other things, in the development of manufacturing, sophistication of 
firms, development of formal institutions, and depth of financial systems.  However, 
across all the countries, the probabilities of receiving supplier credit for a given firm size 
are much higher for SMEs in ethnic networks.  An average-sized networked firm in 
Zambia, for example, has four times the probability (29 percent) of receiving supplier 
credit than an indigenous-African firm (table 10).  Also, the influence of size on the 
probability of receiving credit is much greater for indigenous-African firms than for 
networked SMEs.  In Zambia, for example, one standard deviation higher mean size 
(micro to small) for indigenous-African firms increases the probability of receiving credit 
from 7 percent to 14 percent, a 100 percent increase.  For networked SMEs, one standard 
deviation higher mean size in Zambia raises the probability of receiving credit from 29 
percent to 35 percent, a 21 percent increase.   31
The predicted probabilities of receiving credit also indicate that length of 
relationship is a significant determinant of credit access for indigenous-African SMEs.  
Across average firm size classes and across countries increases in length of relationship 
with supplier raise the chances of receiving supplier credit for indigenous-African firms.  
A micro-enterprise in Zambia, which has a ten year established relationship with its 
supplier (one standard deviation higher than the mean) has a 9% chance of receiving 
credit, an increase of 28%.  The probability of receiving supplier credit for networked 
SMEs, on the other hand, is unaffected by length of relationship with supplier, as we 
noted above.   
 
Table 9: Probability of Receiving Supplier Credit for Indigenous-African Firms 
(Evaluated at various levels of enterprise size and length of supplier relationship) 
  Zambia   Kenya   Zimbabwe 
Micro firm, 4 years 
relation with supplier 
0.07 0.18 0.32 
Micro firm, 10 years 
relation 
0.09 0.23 0.38 
Small firm, 4 years 
relation with supplier 
0.14 0.30 0.47 
Small firm, 10 years 
relation with supplier 
0.18 0.36 0.53 
 
Table 10: Probability of Receiving Supplier credit for Networked SMEs 
(Evaluated at various size classes) 
  Zambia Kenya  Zimbabwe 
Micro firm  0.29 0.36 0.85 
Small firm  0.35 0.43 0.89 
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To recap the main points of the paper before we move on to the implications for 
policy, SSA has an extremely difficult contracting environment.  SMEs respond to this 
poor environment by creating architectures of relation-based governance that substitute 
for missing market-supporting institutions.  In the shock-prone business climate of the 
region, however, it is hard in some cases to create and sustain cooperative, self-enforcing 
relationships, because economic instability can undermine repeated game incentives.  
Tight, ethnically-based networks emerge and thrive in this setting, as there is an added 
need for the information and collectivist system of enforcement that a network can 
provide to help make and sustain relational contracts.  The RPED surveys show that there 
is a coordination failure in the indigenous-African manufacturing business community 
that keeps firms from developing an effective multilateral reputation mechanism 
analogous to that found in ethnic minority networks.  We show that the social capital in 
minority ethnic networks confer major benefits on member firms, facilitating larger size 
at entry, higher productivity, and faster growth.  But there are features of these networks 
that can produce a kind of “lock-in:” stable networks and static patterns of business 
exchange.  Lock-in is reinforced by the economic conditions and sparse business 
environments in SSA.  Stable and cohesive, ethnically-based networks can have adverse 
consequences for income distribution, resource allocation, and competition.  “Outsiders” 
can be excluded from supplier credit and many other business transactions.  Adverse 
network effects fall hardest on indigenous-African firms.   
III. Implications for Institutions and Policies in SSA 
We are now in a better position to address the questions posed at the beginning of 
this paper.  Do interventions to assist SMEs in developing private institutional support 
arrangements make sense for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa?  And, if interventions are 
required, what types of policies or programs might be needed? 
We have shown that African SMEs lacking access to formal institutions and 
facing market failures and high transaction costs have been able to engage in a range of 
productive activities and gain access to needed working capital by creating workable 
private institutional arrangements to govern these transactions.  We have also shown that   33
there are important links between these informal governance institutions and SME 
performance.  It is clear that such relation-based governance mechanisms will be 
important for some time to come in SSA, as it will take time to develop modern formal 
institutions to foster more generalized trust and replace informal governance systems in 
the region.  In the interim, a prudent strategy for institutional development to support 
more market exchange would seem to be twofold: make the environment as supportive as 
possible for relation-based governance and work to build on such private institutional 
arrangements to improve their performance, where feasible.   
 
  Achieving this strategy will require interventions in several areas.  First, the 
business environment in SSA, as we noted, has features that work to undermine and 
weaken incentives for cooperation and inter-firm relational contracting, limiting the 
ability of firms to create and sustain efficient architectures.  Policy reform is needed to 
create a better environment for relation-based governance.  Second, tight, ethnically-
based networks, which have arisen as part of systems of relation-based governance, can 
create adverse (exclusionary) effects for indigenous-African SMEs.  Interventions may be 
needed in some countries to mitigate these adverse network effects. Third, self-help 
substitutes for missing marketing-supporting institutions can go only so far without the 
development of other formal institutions to foster a progressive transition from personal 
to more anonymous exchange.  A cumulative program of building higher quality 
institutions will be needed to enforce property rights and contracts and reduce 
uncertainties and transaction costs.  Each of these rationales for government assistance is 
discussed in turn below together with suggestions for policy and programs. 
Creating a better environment for relation-based governance: A number of theoretical 
and empirical studies suggest that a country does not need a lot of formal institutional 
capacity to achieve a semi-industrial level of income (Rodrik 2003; Dixit 2004).  As 
Dixit (2004, p.151) argues, in early stages of development, when economic activity is on 
a small scale, trade is localized, and economic transactions involve a relatively small 
group of people, self-enforcing governance is feasible.  Elaborate state institutions are not   34
needed.  Some basic protection of property rights is helpful, but even that may be 
achievable privately or using social norms and sanctions.  Even a corrupt state can permit 
reasonably efficient outcomes, if it has sufficient stability.  The lessons from East Asia 
lend support to this view.  Many important economic transactions in these fast-growing 
countries were relation-based rather than rule-based in the formative stages of industrial 
transformation in these countries, demonstrating that one can go a long way on relation-
based governance systems (Bardhan, 2005). 
Consequently, it is essential that governments in SSA aim first to establish a 
stable platform for inter-firm cooperation and relation-based governance of market 
exchange. Where economic and political instability are high, establishing informal 
trading relationships is much harder and market exchange is forced to be highly 
personalized and localized, limiting potential gains from specialization and division of 
labor.  A priority for government should be to reduce instability through better economic 
management and governance.  Unstable macro-economic conditions, resulting in part 
from poor policy management, frequent policy changes, and governance problems, are an 
important cause of instability in the African business climate.  
Addressing undesirable network effects: Networks in SSA generate positive 
externalities and improve the possibilities for market exchange.  But they also can have 
unwanted side effects.  Network externalities and statistical discrimination exclude many 
SMEs from credit and from normal commercial practices.  Policies to address this 
problem should aim at two areas (a) expanding the limits of network boundaries to allow 
more transactions with “outsiders” and (b) mitigating the exclusionary effects of 
networks on disadvantaged firms.  
”Linkage programs” and “cluster development initiatives” could be important in 
underwriting some of the costs of building trust between networked firms and 
“outsiders.”  As we noted earlier, there are accumulated costs in building trust among 
network members and because of these sunk costs, members find it easier to deal with 
each other than to incur the added costs of screening new business partners.  Subsidizing 
some of the costs of bringing firms together in various types of relationships or clusters   35
may be beneficial in expanding the boundaries of networks and reducing the adverse 
effects of lock-in.  Beyond this, broader efforts to help link-up SMEs, particularly 
indigenous-African firms, with foreign investors and larger indigenous enterprises, as 
potential suppliers, could help to compensate for some of the exclusionary effects and 
monopoly power of existing networks.   
Effective implementation of such programs, however, will generally require more 
than just introducing firms to each other.  Building trust takes time and may call for 
efforts to build the capability of excluded firms.  Fisman (2002) finds, for example, that 
preferential access of network members to supplier credit and inputs in some RPED 
countries does not just result from network information and enforcement externalities, but 
can also be attributed to differences in observable firm and owner quality – a skills 
component.  Hence, bringing about improvements in firm quality that would allow 
indigenous-African businesses to compete more generally may also be an effective means 
of improving access to the network.  Education and training directed at indigenous-
African firms might substitute for the skills component that appears to be responsible for 
some of the greater credit access among ethnic businesses.  
Private for-profit provision of information and enforcement may also have some 
merit in expanding network boundaries.  For example, establishing credit rating agencies 
could help to improve access to supplier credit for SMEs with decent credit histories.  
Circulating information about credit repayment histories could assist suppliers in 
screening unreliable business partners and increase the chances of reliable firms in 
getting credit.  While they take time to develop, credit bureaus might also help firms that 
have insufficient collateral qualify for credit from financial institutions offering bills 
discounting and short-term working capital loans.  Efficient private enforcement services, 
such as repossession firms and the like, might have similar effects.  However, as Dixit 
(2004) argues, private enforcement, unlike private provision of information, can often be 
problematic, as a private enforcer can create the demand for his own services and extort 
more from society than any benefits he provides. 
   36
Finally, “lock-in,” in terms of stable business networks and static patterns of 
business exchange, is reinforced by economic conditions in many SSA countries, as we 
noted earlier.  Hence, policy reform efforts that reduce restrictions and regulatory barriers 
on market development and shake things up by improving conditions for innovative 
activity and investment can help to weaken the hold of tight ethnic networks.  Bardhan 
(2005) notes that expanding markets and profit opportunities give salience to incentives 
at the individual level and thus undermine the hold of ethnic networks.  As markets 
develop, particularly for credit, insurance, and information, dependence on ethnic 
networks for these essential functions declines.  By improving outside opportunities and 
exit options for network members, markets reduce the effectiveness of social sanctions 
and cohesiveness, devaluing networking and exclusiveness.  
Policies to mitigate exclusionary effects of ethnic networks on disadvantaged 
firms could also consider preferences aimed at indigenous-African SMEs.  Many 
developing countries have created programs to provide preferential treatment to 
disadvantaged groups in jobs, investments, finance, business contracts and so on.  
Variants of this form of intervention have been introduced in Malaysia, Indonesia, India, 
Philippines, Nigeria, and elsewhere.  Such policies have had short-run positive effects on 
fostering more inclusion and development of the disadvantaged in some countries, 
however, they have generally been costly in the longer run.   
On the positive side, when peer effects and role models are important 
determinants of economic success in a country, preferences for excluded groups can 
increase efficiency by changing the way labor and entrepreneurial talent or finance is 
allocated across occupations and investment opportunities.  Also, to the extent that 
statistical discrimination by way of negative-stereotypes about the capability and 
trustworthiness of excluded groups plays a role in access to finance or business contracts, 
preferential loans or programs to tilt the allocation of government contracts for some 
length of time may help in eliminating such stereotypes.  Finally, in the manner of infant 
industry protection, preferences can offer temporary protection against competition to 
excluded firms, providing them space to learn-by-doing and catch up with others.  Many 
of these factors played a role, for example, in the early successes of Malaysia’s New   37
Economic Policy, which extended preferences to bumiputera or pribumi (see article in 
The Economist 8/27/05).   
But, on the negative side, if continued for too long, preferences can end up being 
a disincentive to learning and efficient resource allocation.  Over time these policies have 
generally resulted in substantial rent seeking and “infants” that have refused to grow up.  
Also, preference policies, once adopted, have been difficult to remove.  In the end, 
Malaysia’s New Economic Policy and Nigeria’s Indigenization Program and others 
remained for too long and resulted in a substantial transfer of rents to the politically well-
connected (for Nigeria see Biersteker 1984). 
Strengthening formal institutions to promote the transition from personal to more 
anonymous exchange: Reliance on informal, private mechanisms to govern contracting 
and market exchange has limits even in the best of cases.  The need for more 
sophisticated forms of formal institutions increases as the market widens and the scope 
for opportunism grows.  More complex formal institutions must evolve to enforce 
property rights and contracts, to reduce uncertainties and transaction costs, and to allow 
the productivity gains from increasing scale and improved technology to be realized.  
Many of these institutional structures are nonexistent, weak, poorly designed, or poorly 
managed in SSA as we detailed earlier.  Governments in the region are also sometimes 
too weak to act as a guarantor of these rights and institutions or are much too predatory in 
their own demands and pose a threat to them. 
What is becoming clear in the theoretical and empirical research on institutional 
development, however, is that it is not always necessary or prudent to try to move 
directly to building a set of formal Western-style legal institutions to solve these 
problems (Rodrik 2003; Dixit 2004).  A cumulative process of building higher quality 
local institutions, working with available informal institutions where feasible, may be a 
better alternative.  The history of most developing countries is a story of sequential 
development of more complex institutions and organizations appropriate for the 
governance of market exchange and investment at particular stages of their development.  
Strategies to strengthen formal institutions should consider moving away from a focus on   38
“best practice” models and shift more attention toward context-specific analysis of 
effective institutional arrangements (including private orderings) that can assist in the 
transition form personal to more anonymous exchange.   
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